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THE CAB CALIFORNIA-TEXAS FARES CASE:
AN INTRASTATE STOPOVER TAKEOVER?
JOHN C. SMUCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The California and Texas boundaries are bold lines on the map,
unmistakably defining vast, important areas. Vaguer boundaries
divide the states' economic regulatory jurisdiction over air carriage
from that exercised by the Civil Aeronautics Board (the Board)
under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (the Act).'
This jurisdictional frontier is marked, not by a map, but by words
in the Constitution, the Act, and decades of decisional law. Yet
from these words there seems to emerge a verbal map that calls
into question whether the Board, in the recent California-Texas
Fares decision,' has not encroached upon state territory in the
field of economic regulatory jurisdiction over air passenger car-
riage.
This decision represents a commendable effort by the Board to
remedy a serious injustice. Nonetheless, the possibility of a juris-
dictional encroachment warrants a close, critical look, for the
decision may affect tens of millions of air carrier revenue dollars
in some of the nation's most important air traffic corridors, the
delicate balance of state-federal relationships, and justice to and
among diverse classes of air travel consumers who number in the
millions.
* B.A., University of Virginia, 1959; LL.B., Harvard University School of
Law, 1962; Attorney at Law, D.C. Bar.
I Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. SS 1301
et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
52 Stat. 973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
'Interstate and Intrastate Fares in California and Texas Markets, CAB Order
No. 76-7-23 (July 7, 1976) (hereinafter referred to as "the decision").
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A. A Disgruntled Passenger Complains.
On August 24, 1971, a man in Washington, D.C., bought a
tickets from United3 "for travel from Washington, D.C. to San
Francisco, from San Francisco to Los Angeles, and from Los
Angles to Washington, D.C. at a total cost of $345 for the trip."
The $345 price included thirty-five dollars for travel between San
Francisco and Los Angeles. During his trip the man found that
other passengers on the plane between San Francisco and Los
Angeles paid only $16.50. He felt that United was unfair to charge
him thirty-five dollars for a service identical to that which it fur-
nished to other passengers for only $16.50.
The disgruntled passenger was Ralph Nader. On September 23,
1971, he and the Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP)'
lodged a formal complaint with the Board. It charged "unjust
discrimination"' by United against Mr. Nader as an "interstate
passenger." It asked the Board to order United and the other fed-
erally certificated airlines providing intrastate services in California,
and pursuing similar practices, to desist from charging "interstate"
passengers one fare and "intrastate" passengers another for the
same service.
On July 8, 1976, following lengthy proceedings,' the Board is-
' Informal names of airlines are used throughout this article.
" Petition of Ralph Nader and Aviation Consumer Action Project, CAB Dock-
et No. 23,859 (Sept. 23, 1971).
ACAP is a nonprofit organization that advocates consumer interests in air
transportation.
' United's practice was alleged to violate § 404(b) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 5
1374(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), which provides:
(b) No air carrier or foreign carrier shall make, give, or cause
any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particu-
lar person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transporta-
tion in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person,
port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any
unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
7 Four years, nine month and fifteen days elapsed between filing of the com-
plaint and issuance of the decision. Order No. 72-9-90, issued September 25, 1972,
defined the proceeding to include certain matters in addition to those included in
the complaint. Hearing was held before an administrative law judge of the Board.
The judge on April 23, 1974, issued an initial decision. It differed in material
particulars from that ultimately rendered by the Board. The Board, in reviewing
the initial decision, received briefs and, on May 14, 1975, heard argument. On
October 29, 1976, the Board adopted Order No. 76-10-138 denying all petitions
for reconsideration and establishing February 1, 1977, as the effective date of
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sued its decision. It found undue discrimination, not between in-
terstate and intrastate passengers, as charged in the complaint, but
between knowledgeable and unknowledgeable interstate passengers.
As the remedy, however, the Board ordered equalization of the
fares charged interstate and intrastate passengers. The equalization
was to be at interstate fare levels, except where competition justi-
fied equalization at a lower level.
B. Are Knowledgeable Consumers Causing Airlines To Engage
In Unjust Discrimination?
Since 1949 Californians have enjoyed air service by intrastate
airlines, which are not subject to economic regulation by the
Board.' More recently, service provided under analogous condi-
tions has become available in Texas and Florida. The intrastate
airlines have offered a low-fare, one-class service with dense seat-
ing in short-haul markets, many of which are heavily traveled.
Responding to this stimulus in California and, for a time, in Texas,
the federally certificated carriers have offered similar or identical
fares in the coach sections of their flights in the same city pairs.
They have, however, confined such fares to "intrastate" passengers
moving locally between points in the same state
the fare equalization requirement. The Board's decision is final and subject to
judicial review pursuant to S 1006 of the Act, 49 U.S.C. S 1486 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975). Participating as parties throughout the case were Ralph Nader and
ACAP, the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC), the National Associa-
tion of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), and the federally certificat-
ed airlines providing intrastate service in the two states. No intrastate airlines par-
ticipated, nor were any allegations of fare discrimination by the intrastate carriers
presented.
'The services of the intrastate carriers are, however, subject to federal regu-
lation on their safety aspects pursuant to Title VI of the Act and regulations is-
sued thereunder. These carriers also conduct certain operations within the terms
of Title IV of the Act (the economic regulatory provisions administered by the
Board) pursuant to exemption orders issued by the Board.
'In California, intrastate fares of both intrastate carriers and federally cer-
tificated airlines must be contained in tariffs filed with and approved by the Public
Utilities Commission (PUC). Texas exercises no regulatory control over air fares.
Additionally, in California the federally certificated airlines have for many
years offered, and still offer, jet commuter fares to "interstate" passengers in the
densest California city pairs. These jet commuter fares are well below the inter-
state coach fares charged by the same airlines for trips of the same distance else-
where on their systems, but are higher than the intrastate fares. For example, in
November between Los Angeles and San Francisco the intrastate fare was $25.50,
including tax; the interstate jet commuter fare was $30, including tax; and the
interstate coach fare, if offered, would have been $48, including tax; OFFICIAL
AIRLINE GUIDE (N. Am. ed. Nov. 15, 1976).
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Knowledge of two basic facts would aid a consumer planning
an itinerary to include visits to a number of California cities.1" First,
relatively low cost air passage can be secured for local movement
between certain pairs of California points. Secondly, a federally
certificated airline will not simultaneously offer to sell both intra-
state passage (at the low intrastate fare) and interstate passage to
or from a point of junction with the intrastate flight segment in-
volved. The passenger who knows these two facts has historically
been in a position to avoid Mr. Nader's fate of being charged an
interstate fare higher than the intrastate fare between two cities in
the same state.
In California-Texas Fares, the Board concluded that the record
demonstrated the existence of unjust discrimination in violation of
section 404(b) of the Act, "particularly in California."'1 The dis-
crimination lay, as noted above, not between interstate and intra-
state passengers," but rather, between two categories of interstate
passengers, "knowledgeable" and "uninformed."
Both classes of passengers involved in the discrimination, the
Board contended, fell into the category of "interstate stopover"
passengers. It divided the "interstate" passengers subject to its
jurisdiction under section 404(b) of the Act into two categories:
"stopover" and "through." As the Board explained this distinction:
The first category consists of stopover passengers, i.e., those pas-
sengers making brief stops at one or more points en route, such as
a passenger traveling from Seattle, Washington, to Los Angeles,
California, who might wish to spend a period in San Francisco
before continuing to his destination. The second category includes
through connecting passengers whose fares are either through fares
10 Interstate-intrastate fare differentials offered by the same carrier have not
been continuously offered in Texas as they have in California. For this reason,
the decision focuses its discussion principally on the situation in California.
" Decision, supra note 3, at 3.
12 The Board's failure to find interstate-intrastate fare discrimination, coupled
with its ordering a remedy for a different sort of discrimination, led one airline
party, Braniff, to petition for reconsideration of the decision. Mr. Nader had
characterized himself as an "interstate" passenger, the victim of "interstate-
intrastate" discrimination. Both initially and throughout, the case was focused on
such discrimination. For this reason, it was Braniff's view that due process of law
would require a limited reopening of the record to permit the parties to address
the "knowledgeable-uninformed" dichotomy upon which the Board at last pre-
mised the decision. By Order No. 76-10-138, adopted October 29, 1976, the
Board denied Braniff's and all other petitions for reconsideration.
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(for those making on-line connections) or joint fares (for passen-
gers making interline connections) 1 . . .
The Board went on to elaborate that through passengers were
not involved in the discrimination because such passengers gen-
erally enjoy lower joint (two-carrier) and through (single-carrier)
interstate fares than could be constructed by local fare combina-
tions-even using the lowest intrastate local fares. "
The Board then explained its concept of the legal distinction
between "interstate stopover" passengers and true intrastate pas-
sengers as follows ("Houston businessman" theory):
Thus, for example, if a businessman living and working in Hous-
ton, Texas, decides while in Houston to meet first with a customer
in Dallas and then with another customer in Chicago before re-
turning to his home in Houston, he should in theory pay the inter-
state fare for the first leg of his journey, the trip between Houston
and Dallas. If, on the other hand, he decides to travel on to Chi-
cago only after he arrives in Dallas, he is moving in intrastate com-
merce on the first leg of his journey and should pay the intrastate
fare for that same Houston-Dallas trip. The distinction lies in the
intent of the traveler determined before the commencement of the
journey.1
Discrimination, the Board said, flows from the fact that some of
these "interstate stopover" passengers are knowledgeable and
others, uninformed:
While the theoretical distinction between intrastate and interstate
commerce presents no conceptual difficulties, the application of the
distinction has proved to be accompanied by grave deficiencies in
view of the actual workings of the market place. The carriers have
no way of knowing a passenger's underlying intent except insofar
as the passenger reveals it during the ticketing process, and it is
obvious from the record here that a great many interstate passen-
gers are not disclosing the entirety of their travel plans. Hence they
are paying the lower intrastate fares for travel which is in fact in-
terstate . . . It is thus apparent that the more knowledgeable
interstate passengers moving in these markets are routinely paying
the lower intrastate fares, leaving only those interstate travelers
who are unaware of the lower fares (or that they can be obtained
simply by pressuring the carrier or by making the reservation for
"
3 Decision, supra note 3, at 4.
14Id.
15 ld. at 5.
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the intrastate leg of the journey separately) to pay the higher
fares ....
We believe that the availability and use of the two differing fare
levels under these circumstances clearly creates unjust discrimina-
tion with the meaning of Subsection 404(b) of the Act .... 6
The blame for the discrimination was thus lifted from the airlines,
who "have no way of knowing" what is going on, and placed
squarely on the shoulders of the knowledgeable consumers who
allegedly lack candor and "are not disclosing the entirety of their
travel plans."
The Board next rejected a suggestion by Continental that the
Board order the carriers to inform the passengers of the avail-
ability of the intrastate fares, saying: "The difficulty with this solu-
tion is that it knowingly leads to the treatment of interstate trips
as intrastate trips, contrary to fact."" Instead, the Board said,
"[W]e have concluded that these discriminations can be corrected
only by eliminating the fare differentials themselves.'"" The Board
conceded that its chosen remedy for discrimination between two
descriptions of interstate passengers could raise the fares charged
intrastate passengers who are not subject to the Board's regulatory
jurisdiction. The Board, however, found absolution for any such
side effect in the Shreveport" and Wisconsin Passenger Fares"* deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court.'1
In prescribing the lawful, single interstate fare to be charged
for local movement over intrastate segments, the Board designated
"the rates ... established for operations throughout" the federally-
certificated airlines' "domestic systems generally"" but allowed for
"Id. at 6.
'
7 Id. at 10 n.26.
'lid. at 10.
"Houston, E. & W.T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
"R.R. Comm'n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922).
21 The California PUC and NARUC unsuccessfully contended in petitions for
reconsideration that the Board has invalidly applied these cases. A discussion of
this point is beyond the scope of the present article.
22Decision, supra note 3, at 11-12. It is not clear whether the Board's order
outlaws the interstate jet commuter fares described supra note 9 or requires that
they be separately justified. The decision directs that the fares be "constructed in
accordance with Order No. 74-12-109." Paragraph 8 of Order No. 74-12-109,
which contains the fare formula, concludes with the following sentence:
In connection with the filing of tariffs required by this paragraph,
the carriers may, without economic justification, maintain each class
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the submission, as exceptions to the general rule, of "competitive
fares" in markets served by intrastate carriers."
C. The Decision Will Have Major Impact On Airlines, Consumers,
And Federal-State Relations.
The decision cites estimates by the airline parties that for the
Board to order equalization of the interstate and intrastate fares
will cause revenue losses to the airlines. These losses are stated
as either $10,000,000 or $28,000,000 annually, depending on the
level at which equalization occurs."" The decision gives the carriers
an option to match intrastate carrier fares, or not to do so, or to
do so selectively and partially. There is thus a major potential im-
pact on consumers, both stopover and true intrastate according
to the Board's construction of these categories.
In fiscal 1975, through but two of the various California city
pairs which receive federally certificated air service, over one mil-
lion passengers moved on the federally certificated airlines alone
for through or stopover change of planes." The fares to be paid
in the future by many of these passengers will be determined or
influenced by the decision.
The decision directly shrinks the jurisdictional sphere of the
state agencies in intrastate common carriage. It deprives the states
of effective regulatory control over fares paid by both knowledge-
able stopover and true intrastate passengers using federally certi-
ficated carriers solely within the state. Moreover, it impliedly as-
serts federal jurisdiction over transportation by intrastate airlines
of knowledgeable interstate stopover passengers presumably de-
of fare, other than basic fares (i.e. first class, coach, economy, jet
custom and standard), at its present dollar levels or at the exising
(sic) percentage relationship to the corresponding basic fare.
If the jet commuter fares are lawful under this paragraph or otherwise, it
would appear to be beyond the scope of California-Texas Fares to order them
increased.
23 Decision, supra note 3, at 13; At this writing, the time for filing petitions
for judicial review of the decision has not expired, and it appears likely that the
state agencies may in fact file petitions for such review.
"Decision, supra note 3, at 13 n.31.
2 Los Angeles-San Francisco and Los Angeles-San Diego, per CAB, Origin-
Destination Survey of Airline Passenger Traffic, 12 Months Ended June 30,
1975, as shown in Proposed Amendments to the Federal Aviation Act: Hearings
on H.R. 10560 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public
Works and Transportation, App. A, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (testimony on
behalf of Pacific Southwest Airlines).
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ceiving the latter airlines by posing as true intrastate passengers.
The finding in the decision that the number of these dissemblers
using federally certificated airlines is not de minimis," in the ab-
sence of any quantitative information in the record, implies a readi-
ness to find that they are similarly not de minimis as a fraction of
the traffic using the intrastate carriers. Such a finding would sub-
ject the latter carriers to a federal certification requirement, ending
the intrastate status that has been accorded to them for well over
twenty-five years. The decision may also have a direct and im-
mediate competitive impact on the intrastate airlines. The fare
flexibility afforded the federally certificated airlines in the interest
of allowing them to remain competitive with the intrastate car-
riers, permits them to offer low fares to interstate traffic which the
intrastate airlines are prohibited from carrying.
The decision will stand as an important precedent in the reso-
lution of federal-state air transport issues, of which a number have
surfaced recently. In Congress, pending "deregulation," "regula-
tory reform" and other bills are challenging the form and elasticity
of traditional "intrastate" concepts. At the Board, federal-state con-
flicts are simmering in the Lake Tahoe Service Investigation" and
in a third party enforcement complaint against ticketing practices
of one intrastate airline, Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA), sub-
mitted by United to the Board in late 1975." The decision in Cali-
fornia-Texas Fares may thus significantly affect airlines, consumers,
and the relationships between the states and the federal government.
D. There Is A Big Difference Between Through and Stopover
Passengers.
Just who are the through passengers? They pay the lowest fares
of all. The Board's decision defines them solely in terms of the low
fares they pay. It correctly observes that the lowness of these fares,
2Decision, supra note 3, at 6.
1 CAB Docket No. 29,000 (June 11, 1976). See related case of Public Utili-
ties Comm'n v. CAB, No. 75-2070 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
28 In CAB Docket No. 28,495, United on October 21, 1976, submitted a mo-
tion for review by the Board of a staff decision not to docket an enforcement
petition against PSA. Quoting the identical language from the decision set forth
in section I.B of this article, supra, United's motion concludes, at 6, "There can-
not be any doubt that a passenger who purchases a ticket outside of California
to travel on PSA within California is an interstate passenger within the meaning
of the Board's clear pronouncement in the Order 76-7-23."
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in comparison with possible combinations of local interstate and
intrastate fares, deprives through passengers of any claim to status
as section 404(b) discrimination victims."
Aside from the difference between through and stopover fares,
however, it is also important to understand the difference between
the purpose of a through and of a stopover passenger. Through
passengers, often also called "connecting" passengers, generally
seek the most rapid possible movement between two given points.
To illustrate, the two points may be designated A and C. Travel
between them is accomplished by change of flights, and perhaps
carriers, at B. It is generally accepted that the through or connect-
ing passenger has no activities planned at B other than the transfer,
and that anything the passenger does at B will be incidental to
the movement between A and C.
In law, as in commercial fact, a trip between A and C via a
connection at B is recognized as one continuous trip. When A is
in one state and B and C are both situated in a second state, the
intrastate location of the B-C segment cannot change the charac-
ter of that portion of the trip to anything but one portion of an
interstate (A-C) trip. Thus, the interstate character of through
traffic moving over combined interstate and intrastate air segments
was not an issue in California-Texas Fares, and is too well-settled
for controversy."
29 The current (November 1976) fare structure in fact results in some through
passengers receiving free transportation over intrastate California segments. Ma-
terial aspects of this structure are under investigation in the pending Domestic
Common Fares Investigation, CAB Docket No. 27,330. The technical causes of
the free transportation are (1) common fares to and from different California
points now applicable between these points and points in the eastern United States,
and (2) permission to the airlines under the decision in Domestic Passenger
Fare Investigation, Phase 4, CAB Order No. 74-12-108 (Dec. 27, 1974), to hold
joint and through fares-those offered via through routings involving a change
of plane-to levels authorized for nonstop and other single-plane routings, in
order to permit the change-of-plane routings to compete effectively.
For example, a Philadelphia-San Francisco coach fare for nonstop service on
United's flight 67 is $198 including tax. The same fare is available for a routing
from Philadelphia to Los Angeles on United flight 99 and a fifty-five minute
connection to United flight 887 from Los Angeles to San Francisco. Since the
fare on United flight 99 nonstop from Philadelphia to Los Angeles is likewise
$198, the trip from Los Angeles to San Francisco is "free." Official Airline Guide
(N. Am. ed. Nov. 15, 1976). Such bargains are available to through but not to
stopover passengers.
30 E.g., Saturn Airways, Inc., Application, CAB Order No. 75-10-41, at 10
(1975) (citing Oregon-Washington R. & S. Nay. Co. v. Strauss & Co., 73 F.2d
1976]
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The Board, however, posited as the basis underlying its decision
that the second category of passengers-the stopover passengers-
are also to be regarded as interstate in character. The Board de-
scribed these stopover passengers as "those passengers making brief
stops at one or more points en route, such as a passenger traveling
from Seattle, Washington, to Los Angeles, California, who might
wish to spend a period in San Francisco before continuing to his
destination."' This language seems possibly misleading in two re-
spects: the reference to "brief" stops "en route" and the term
"destination." The difficulty with the term "brief" is that there is
no record or other basis for applying the term to stopovers. The
terms "en route" and "destination," as used, assume facts to be ex-
plored, and thus seem to beg the question of the interstate or intra-
state status of stopover passengers, as will be shown.
1. How "brief" is a stopover?
Stopovers are regulated by carrier tariffs, not by the Act or
regulations thereunder. These tariffs do not limit the maximum
duration of a stopover. Since no maximum is specified, there is
no definitional guarantee of brevity. The tariffs do provide a
minimum period of four hours, and thus assure a substantial inter-
ruption as a prerequisite to the assessment of stopover charges such
as those paid by Mr. Nader."
912 (9th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 723 (1935) and numerous cases cited
in section II of this article, infra).
" Decision, supra note 3, at 4.
s, The domestic passenger rules tariff applicable to the transportation at issue
currently provides (September 1976), in pertinent part:
Rule 5 . . . Stopover means a deliberate interruption of a
journey by the passenger, agreed to in advance by the carrier, at
a point between the place of departure and the place of destination.
Rule 100 . . . [S]topovers will be permitted . . . only upon
payment of the combination of applicable fares ....
A stopover, as used herein, will occur when a passenger arrives
at an intermediate or junction transfer point either: [*]
On a flight of any carrier and fails to depart from such inter-
mediate or junction transfer point on - [*]
(a) the first flight on which space is available; or
(b) the flight that will provide for the passenger's earliest arrival
at intermediate or junction transfer point(s) or destination point,
via the carrier and class of service as shown on the passenger's
ticket. Provided, however that in no event will a stopover occur
when the passenger departs from the intermediate or juntction
[sic] transfer point on a flight shown in carrier's official general
CALIFORNIA-TEXAS FARES
Thus, unless a passenger affirmatively desires to delay his transit
between point A and point C for four hours (or more, depending
on schedules), he will not be classified as a stopover but rather
as a through passenger. The duration of the stopover at point B
is constrained only by the limitations on a ticketing agent's ability
to reserve space beyond a certain time in the future' and not really
by that, since the agent can write up the post-stopover flight stage
as "open."
There thus appears no ready basis in law, rules or tariffs to
support the CAB's conclusion that the duration of passenger stays
at stopover points is "brief" in comparison with that of stays at
other points called "destinations." The decision does not identify
an evidentiary basis for such a characterization.
2. To what "destination" is a passenger making stopovers at both
ends of an intrastate segment "en route"?
The concept of destination is significant in determining the char-
acter of traffic. It will be seen from the discussion of Supreme Court
decisions ' that the significant destination has always been the
destination of intent, and this factor has been regarded as particu-
larly important where the destination on the waybill or ticket dif-
fered from the intended destination, as it often does.
What is the significant destination of a stopover passenger? As
described earlier herein, Mr. Nader's trip was "from Washington,
D.C., to San Francisco, from San Francisco to Los Angeles, and
from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C." We must infer from the
schedules and/or service patterns as departing within four hours
after his arrival at such point.
AIRLINE TARIFF Pun. Co., LOCAL AND JOINT PASSENGER RULES TARIFF No. PR-6
(CAB No. 142). The clarity of the above rule would appear to be aided by
transferring the word "either" from the location of the first to the second asterisk.
33 In a proceeding involving consideration of international stopover authority
(international stopovers have generally been permitted free, i.e., at no charge
in excess of the through fare over the applicable routing) an administrative law
judge noted:
At the present they [the foreign flag airlines] are able to permit a
stopover for 1 year since, under IATA rules, the tickets of the
IATA carriers are valid for such a period of time.
Transatlantic Route Renewal Case, Reopened, 46 C.A.B. 75, 100 (1966) (Rec-
ommended Decision of Examiner Keith).
But tickets may be reissued for different flights, and unused coupons for por-
tions of domestic stopover itineraries can be cashed. As to international stop-
overs, see section IV.B. of this article, infra.
'See sections II, III infra.
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fare Mr. Nader paid, as recited, that he planned activities in both
Los Angeles and San Francisco, each requiring more than four
hours away from the airport. 5 Which, then, was Mr. Nader's des-
tination? First, Mr. Nader had a ticketed destination of Washing-
ton, D.C., the same as his origin. All round trip ticketed passen-
gers-a large percentage of total passengers-have ticketed des-
tinations identical with ticketed origins." A technical contention
is possible that a round trip is interstate in character throughout
if it passes through airspace outside the state of origin."' The argu-
ment ignores commercial realities, and it is clear that the Board
does not in California-Texas Fares rely on such a theory. The
Board does not seem ordinarily to regard the ticketed destination
as the economically significant destination of a passenger. The
statistical air traffic data base compiled under Board supervision,
and relied upon as the principal evidentiary basis in certification
and other proceedings before the Board, uses other definitions of
31 Mr. Nader's itinerary is noteworthy in that he could break his journey at
either of the California cities and it would become his destination for fare pur-
poses, so long as he did not require a stopover at the other. This was the case
because a fare of $155, including tax, was available on United for Washington-
Los Angeles via San Francisco and an identical fare was available for San
Francisco-Washington via Los Angeles. AIRLINE TARIFF PUB. Co., LOCAL PAS-
SENGER FARES TARIFF No. PF-10 (CAB No. 136). In the situation where one
visited city is considerably more distant than another from the passenger's point
of ticketed origin, such a routing choice would not be available. For instance, in
the Board's Seattle-San Francisco-Los Angeles itinerary example, see decision,
supra note 3, at 4, only Los Angeles could be visited for a substantial period
without paying a stopover charge. There would be a stopover charge for a pro-
tracted visit to San Francisco even if the passenger turned around at Los Angeles
in less than the four hours provided in the tariff rule, supra note 32. But both
Mr. Nader's trip and the Board's example have in common an inferable purpose
to conduct significant non-incidental activities at each end of the intrastate seg-
ment, and the payment of a substantial sum for the privilege.
"'The reference to destination in the domestic rules tariff stopover definition
seems to refer to this ticketed destination.
Rule 5 . . . "Destination (Applicable only to BN and PA) means the ultimate
destination of the passenger's journey as shown on the ticket." AIRLINE TARIFF
PUB. Co., LoCAL AND JOINT PASSENGER RULES TARIFF No. PR-6 (CAB No. 142).
87 The technical basis is the Act's definition of interstate air transportation, in
pertinent part, as "between places in the same State . . . through the airspace
over any place outside thereof," § 101(21), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (21). The technique
is to equate "between places" with "to and from the same place." Such a rationale
might with some validity be applied to sight-seeing flights. Otherwise, it seems
for the most part a negation of the commercial significance of air transportation,
which is a means of rapidly moving persons and things from one place to an-
other place-a characteristic recognized in the language employed by the fram-
ers of the Act.
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destination." These definitions are presented in the forms of calcu-
lations and comparisons to be performed with the tickets sampled
in compiling the data. They are not accompanied by any economic
rationalization for the results produced. The presentation occupies
three large, well-filled pages, including eighteen examples of dif-
ferent types of itineraries and their classification in terms of origin
and destination.
Application of these standards to Mr. Nader's trips, for example,
involves use of three different intermediate definitions of destina-
tion (D1, D2 and D3), calculation of the "track," and comparison
of one-half the track with the various "D" numbers. The end result
is to identify San Francisco--not Los Angeles-as Mr. Nader's
westbound destination and as the origin of his eastbound return.
The description of this calculation shows immediately that there
is no consideration of the passenger's intent. More importantly,
the determination does not reflect the most significant objectively
classifiable datum-the duration of stays in the respective points
visited.
To summarize, it is somewhat misleading for the Board in its
decision to describe stopovers as "brief" stops "en route" to a "des-
tination." In Mr. Nader's case, such an analysis implies significance
to his visit to one California city (San Francisco?) and brevity
and insignificance to his activities at the other (Los Angeles?)
without any evidentiary support. The significant, classifiable know-
ledge we have about Mr. Nader's purposes, and those of all the
stopover passengers involved in the decision, is that they plan im-
portant activities in each California point visited; activities which
cannot be concluded in less time than four hours, and which may
require days, weeks or months. We know that these passengers pay
a substantial sum for the right to visit each city.
Such an understanding of the differences between the charac-
teristics of the through and stopover passengers distinguished in
31 CAB, ORIGIN-DESTINATION SURVEY OF AIRLINE PASSENGER TRAFFIC, Vol.
VIII-3-1 (3d qtr. 1975).
Once the trips are extracted from a stopover ticket such as Mr. Nader's pur-
suant to the directions described above, the stopover and through passengers are
intermingled as fungible statistics. No means of distinguishing the two categories
is provided, for the element of duration peculiar to stopovers is not recorded.
Thereafter, when the data are used in Board proceedings, it may often be as-
sumed without question that the statistics all relate to through passengers.
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the decision provides the foundation for a review of judicial de-
cisions which bear on the character of these descriptions of traffic
as either "interstate" or "intrastate."
II. THE SUPREME COURT CASES WHICH HOLD TRIPS INTERSTATE
IN SPITE OF STOPS RELY ON THROUGH As OPPOSED TO
STOPOVER NATURE OF THE INTERRUPTIONS.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has had many occasions to
distinguish between continuous interstate or international and bro-
ken intrastate or domestic movements and has rendered helpful
and informative opinions on both sides, depending on the facts of
each case. For the most part, cases have arisen from challenges to
state authority to levy personalty taxes on goods, or to regulate
their carriage, on the ground that the goods were "in commerce"
constitutionally subject to taxation or regulation only by Congress."
The CAB, however, has recognized in California-Texas Fares* as
well as in a number of past orders 1 that the principles evolved in
this line of precedent apply across the line of the distinction be-
tween goods and passengers, and to the statutory determination
whether a passenger is in "air transportation" as well as to the
constitutional question whether he is "in commerce."
" "The Congress shall have Power . . .To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.,
art. I, S 8, cl. 3. Personal property taxation and state regulation cases turning on
this clause cite each other interchangeably.
10 "The traditional test, adopted from Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S.
163, 178 (1928) by the Board in Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Enforce-
ment Proceeding, 40 C.A.B. 745, 746 (1964) is that '. . . the desti-
nation which was intended by the passenger when he begins the
journey and which was known to the carrier and for which he pur-
chased a ticket determines the character of the trip.' As Baltimore
& O.S.W.R.R. v. Settle, 260 U.S. 166, 171 (1922) makes clear,
however, the movement is interstate, given the requisite intent,
whether or not that intent is communicated to the carrier or is re-
flected in the itinerary stated on the ticket."
Decision, supra note 3, at 5 n.11.
4' See section IV.A. of this article, infra.
Generally, movement in interstate commerce has been held taboo for state
regulation or unapportioned, ad valorem property taxation even in the absence
of action by Congress. Movement affecting interstate commerce has been held
subject to state regulation unless Congress has taken preemptive action. The
definition of "air commerce" in the Act includes "any operation ...of aircraft
which .. .affects .. .interstate . .. commerce." Act, § 101(4), 49 U.S.C. §
1301(4) (emphasis supplied). Air commerce is the concept governing the scope
of safety regulation under Title VI of the Act, and is effective to preempt state
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A. Sheep-Driving Or Sheep-Grazing?
Making a steady nine miles per day, Kelley's sheep grazed their
way across Wyoming from Utah to Nebraska. Mr. Rhoads, County
Assessor of Laramie County, Wyoming, assessed them for taxes.'
In considering whether the sheep were subject to taxation, the
Court said:
The question turns upon the purpose for which the sheep were
driven into the State. If for the purpose of being grazed, they are
expressly within the first section of the [taxing] act. But if for the
purpose of being driven through the State to a market, they would
be exempt as a subject of interstate commerce, though they might
incidentally have supported themselves in grazing while actually
in transit ....
It thus appears that the only purpose found for which this herd of
sheep was being driven across the State was for shipment ....
The fact that the sheep may not have lost flesh, or may even have
gained flesh, during their transit through the State, is impertinent,
unless the primary purpose of their being driven there was for
grazing."
The Court thus held Wyoming's tax invalidly applied. In so doing,
it stated and applied a recurring test: Was the principal purpose
movement in interstate commerce, and was the alleged interruption
-in this case, grazing-incidental to the movement? The Court
found that the sheep were indeed moving in interstate commerce.
In order for them to move on foot across five hundred miles of
Wyoming, it was necessary that they, incidentally, graze.
B. Transfers Incident To Travel, Or Reticketings In An Effort
To Take Advantage Of Local Rates, Do Not Break An In-
terstate Trip.
Following Kelley, a line of cases developed more fully the types
of pauses that would not result in breaking an interstate journey.
Without exception, the factors relied on by the Court were the
regulation of safety in U.S. airspace. The economic regulatory concept of air
transportation, in contrast, does not embody the expansive "affecting" formula.
See Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 473 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Thus,
whether a particular activity is "in air transportation" is governed by principles
similar to those determining whether a movement is in commerce under the
Commerce clause.
'Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903).
" Id., at 7-9.
1976]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
same as today seem to characterize the movement of through air
passengers, in contradistinction to stopover passengers. A series of
brief quotations from the opinions will serve to illustrate the de-
velopment of the doctrine:
[T]he wharves were intended for shipping facilities, a means of
transition from land carriage to water carriage.... In other words,
the manufacture or concentration on the wharves of the terminal
company are but incidents, under the circumstances presented by
the record, in the transshipment of the products in export trade,
and their regulation is within the power of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.*'
[H]ere, a rate is fixed on that part of an interstate carriage which
includes the actual placing of the coal into vessels ready to be car-
ried beyond the state destination."
The determining circumstance is that the shipment of the lumber
to Sabine was but a step in its transportation to its real and ulti-
mate destination in foreign countries. In other words, the essential
character of the commerce, not its mere accidents, should deter-
mine ..."
Nor was there a break, in the sense of the interstate commerce
law and the cited cases, in the continuity of the transportation of
the lumber to foreign countries by the delay and its transshipment
at Sabine. ....
The staves and logs were intended by the shippers to be exported
to foreign countries, and there was no interruption of their trans-
portation to their destination except what was necessary for trans-
shipment at New Orleans."9
[W]hile there was no through-rate and no through-route, there was
in fact a through shipment from St. Louis, Missouri, to Leadville,
Colorado. Its interstate character could not be destroyed by ignor-
ing the points of origin and destination, separating the rate into its
component parts and by charging local rates and issuing local way-
bills, attempting to convert an interstate shipment into intrastate
transportation."0
[W]here commodities are in fact destined from one state to an-
45Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 526 (1911) (emphasis
supplied).
46 Railroad Comm'n of Ohio v. Worthington, 225 U.S. 101, 109 (1912).
47 Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111, 126 (1913).
41 Id., at 130.
49 Railroad Comm'n of La. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 229 U.S. 336, 341, 342
(1913).
50Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver, R.G.R.R., 233 U.S. 479, 490 (1914).
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other, a rebilling or reshipment en route does not of itself break
the continuity of their movement or require that any part be classi-
fied differently from the remainder. As this court has often said, it
is the essential character of the commerce, not the accident of
local or through bills of lading, that is decisive."
The coal was in the course of transportation to another state when
the cars left the mine. There was no interruption of the movement;
it always continued towards points as originally intended."'
Goods transshipped (passengers connected) or double-billed
(passengers double-ticketed) solely for the purpose of movement
in commerce remain in commerce despite incidental or paper in-
terruptions. Their status is continuous and interstate, like the con-
ceded status of through air passengers making connections over
intrastate segments, discussed in California-Texas Fares.
C. The Supreme Court Seems To Disclaim The Board's "Houston
Businessman" Theory.
The "Houston businessman" example given by the Board to il-
lustrate the distinction between "interstate stopover" and "true
intrastate" passengers has been quoted earlier."3 It compares the
"interstate" Houston businessman-the methodical individual who
plans business in both Dallas and Chicago while still in Houston-
with the casual, loose "intrastate" Houstonian who puts together
a deal in Dallas and only then decides to jet off to Chicago. The
decision seems to urge that this distinction, which allegedly "pre-
sents no conceptual difficulties," arises from the "historic definition
of interstate commerce."'" A principal citation given for these and
related propositions is Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R. v. Settle."
Settle belongs to the line of cases noted above, holding that
when the essential character of a movement is through, as deter-
mined by its purpose, efforts by the device of multiple billing at
intrastate rates to obtain for that movement a more favorable rate
51Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U.S. 346, 349 (1917).
52Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. Hancock, 253 U.S. 284, 286 (1920). A case under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. requiring the acci-
dent to be "in commerce between . . . States," illustrates the migration of the
constitutional "in Commerce" test into a statute. Cf. McCluskey v. Marysville &
N. Ry., 243 U.S. 36 (1917), cited at note 76, infra.
" See section I.B., supra.
"4 Decision, supra note 3, at 5.
"260 U.S. 166 (1922).
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than that applicable to the through trip under I.C.C. tariffs will
fail. The case embodies a clear exposition of the principles under
discussion, but breaks no new ground. Importantly, though, Settle
does seem to dismiss the Board's "Houston businessman" theory
that the formation, at the outset of travel, of an intent to complete
a series of movements necessarily renders the series in legal con-
templation one continuous movement: "The instances are many
where a local shipment follows quickly upon an interstate shipment
and yet is not to be deemed to be part of it, even though some
further shipment was contemplated when the original movement
began."5 As will appear, other opinions seem uniform in their
unwillingness to adopt a "Houston businessman" theory holding
any movement intended at the outset of an itinerary to be "con-
tinuous."
D. Safety Stops Do Not Interrupt An Interstate Journey.
There is what might be termed a safety corollary to the inci-
dental rule. It would have been unsafe for Kelley to drive his sheep
across Wyoming without ever allowing them to graze. Safety is
always incidental to movement.
A month after the Settle decision, Chief Justice Taft delivered
the Court's opinion in the Brattleboro case." In a log drive, logs
were impounded by a boom erected across the mouth of the West
River, awaiting abatement of high waters imperiling the logs on
the Connecticut River into which the West flowed. The Town of
Brattleboro asserted that a taxable halt had occurred. The Court
rejected this argument:
The boom at the mouth of the West river did not constitute an
entrepot or depot for the gathering of logs preparatory for the final
journey. It was only a safety appliance in the course of the jour-
ney. It was a harbor of refuge from danger to a shipment on its
way. It was not used by the owner for any beneficial purpose of
its own except to facilitate the safe delivery of the wood at Hins-
dale on their final journey already begun. The logs were not de-
tained to be classified, measured, counted, or in any way dealt with
by the owner for his benefit except to save them from destruction
51 Id. at 173 (emphasis supplied). On the other hand, where the decision for
onward movement is made only after reaching Dallas, the court cases support
the Board's expressed view that the movement is always intrastate. Bracht v. San
Antonio & A. P. Ry., 254 U.S. 489 (1921).
57260 U.S. 366 (1922).
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in the course of their journey that, but for natural causes over
which he could exercise no control, would have been actually con-
tinuous."'
E. If Speed Is The Chief Objective, A Pause For Any Convenient
Step In Achieving It Does Not Break The Movement.
A few brief quotations from decisions issued after Settle and
Brattleboro will demonstrate that the Court has continued to test
the continuity of journeys by the same consistent guiding prin-
ciples:
The change in the method of transportation by floating to carriage
on a vessel did not affect the continuity of the interstate passage,
if such a passage was intended by the parties and had begun. ... "
The quickness of transshipment in both [the Sabine Tram Co. and
the instant] cases was the chief object each exporter plainly sought.
In both cases the selection of the point of shipment and the equip-
ment at that point were solely for the speedy and continuous ex-
port of the product abroad and for no other purpose."
[I]f the halt in the movement of the goods is a convenient inter-
mediate step in the process of getting them to their final destina-
tions, they remain 'in commerce' until they reach those points. 1
While most of the foregoing cases dealt with freight, their prin-
ciples are equally applicable to passenger transportation. They
were thus applied in the case of Mrs. Nothnagle when she bought
from the New Haven Railroad a ticket from Meriden, Connecticut,
to Fall River, Massachusetts, requiring a one hour and ten minute
wait between connecting trains in New Haven. On the New Haven
platform between trains, Mrs. Nothnagle handed her suitcase to a
redcap. There were mixed results. She never saw the suitcase again,
but her name was written indelibly into the reports of the Supreme
Court."2 Mrs. Nothnagle sought to defeat the federal interstate
00 id. at 373, 374. Cf. Canadian Colonial Airways, 2 C.A.B. 752 (1941), dis-
cussed infra at section IV.A.
"0Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469, 474 (1926).
80Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95, 109 (1929).
0" Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 568 (1943). Cf. Higgins
v. Carr Bros., 317 U.S. 572 (1943), discussed in text at note 64, infra. These
are cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975), construing what is in commerce. Commerce, in turn, "means . . .
commerce . . . among the several States .... " 29 U.S.C. § 203(b).
6New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128 (1953).
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tariff baggage liability limitation by asserting that her trip was an
intrastate Meriden-New Haven trip, broken by the New Haven
transfer stop from the New Haven-Fall River interstate leg. The
Court held, correctly as would appear from the cases hereinbefore
cited, that this claim was without merit: "In this case respondent
undertook a voyage from Connecticut to Massachusetts, with a
temporary stopover for transfer"' along the way ...."
It appears, in summary, that a long and unbroken line of Su-
preme Court cases has relied on the very factors that distinguish
through from stopover passengers in finding movements to be
continuous and interstate in character. Let us now look at the
other side of this coin, the stop made by some passengers for rea-
sons other than facilitation of an onward journey.
HI. THE SUPREME COURT CASES HAVE HELD STOPOVER TYPE
INTERRUPTIONS TO BREAK THE INTERSTATE JOURNEY.
A. Non-Incidental Interruptions Break Interstate Movement
Where Not Fully Communicated To The Carrier (Knowledge-
able Stopovers).
A person who plans an interstate movement, preceded or fol-
lowed by a break for activities not incidental to the furtherance of
that movement, and carries out his plan without informing the
carrier of such plan in advance, may be compared to the knowl-
edgeable stopover passenger in California-Texas Fares. The Su-
preme Court, however, has consistently held such users legally
entitled to the benefits of state regulation (or subject to the burdens
of state personalty taxation).
In a leading case," flatboat-loads of Pennsylvania coal were
brought from Pittsburgh to New Orleans where they lay on the
Mississippi River awaiting sale in boatload lots. Some boatloads
would eventually move on, pursuant to sales for export, and be
transhipped to ocean vessels. Other boatloads were destined for
intrastate movement to Louisiana plantations. The Court held
Louisiana's personal property tax validly assessed:
s The term "stopover for transfer" as used by the Court in Nothnagle ap-
pears synonymous with through as used by the Board in California-Texas Fares.
"
4 New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. at 130 (1958).
1 Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885).
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The coal had come to its place of rest, for final disposal or use,
and was a commodity in the market of New Orleans. It might con-
tinue in that condition for a year or two years, or only for a day.
It had become a part of the general mass of property in the state.
66
A 1907 decision," qualified-but approved as "consistent"--in
the Settle case," concerned carloads of corn waybilled interstate
from South Dakota to Texarkana, Texas, and five days later
separately consigned, in the same car, to a different railroad for
"intrastate" shipment to the corn's ultimate purchaser in Gold-
thwaite, Texas. The Court upheld the Texas position that the low
intrastate rate applied, rather than the higher interstate proportion
demanded by the railroad. The broker in the corn transaction
maintained a practice of taking delivery of Texas-destined com-
modities in Texarkana and reconsigning and rebilling intrastate
to get the lower rates. While the finding of a non-incidental inter-
ruption of journey in Gulf seems open to question on the facts, the
decision has never been overruled and does stand, among a number
of other cases, for the proposition that a substantial interruption,
although at all times intended, will justify application of intrastate
rates.
The storage of oil in tanks in Memphis, following its carriage
from Pennsylvania and preceding its onward shipment to Arkansas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi, subjected the oil to personal property
tax, which the Court upheld."' In this opinion, the Court presented
the governing principle in a form seemingly helpful in assessing
the character of Mr. Nader's movement within California: "The
beginning and the ending of the transit which constitutes inter-
state commerce are easy to mark. [Citing and discussing cases].
But intermediate between these points questions may arise ... ."
Noting that the Memphis oil distributing business of plaintiff in-
"Id. at 632, 633. Accord: American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500
(1904); Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577 (1895).
1
7 Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403 (1907).
11 "The decision in Gulf . .. relied upon by defendants in error, is entirely
consistent with these later decisions of this court, although some expressions
in the opinion are not." Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R. v. Settle, 260 U.S. 166 (1973),
discussed supra note 40.
"9General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
70 Id. at 228, 229.
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volved the filling of numerous small orders, impractical while the
oil remained in tank cars, the Court observed: "This certainly de-
scribes a business,-describes a purpose for which the oil is taken
from transportation, brought to rest in the state, and for which
the protection of the state is necessary,-a purpose outside of the
mere transportation of the oil." 1 Similarly, for a purpose outside
the mere transport of his person from place to place, Mr. Nader
took himself from transportation at both San Francisco and Los
Angeles, each time coming to rest in California, under the protec-
tion of the state.
Continuing to develop the doctrine of non-incidental purpose,
the Court next found a tax properly levied on piles of coal in
New Jersey:
The conclusion of the district court was that, by the storage of
coal, appellant 'obtained two beneficial results. First, cars arriving
when no bottoms were on hand could be released and demurrage
charges saved; second, when bottoms arrived and no cars were on
hand containing the kinds of coal desired, such vessels could be
loaded from the piles, resulting in a saving of time in the departure
of such bottoms.' In other words, there was something more than
the submission to delay in transportation and the acceptance of
its consequences."
So with Mr. Nader's visits to San Francisco and Los Angeles, as
with any ticketed passenger paying stopover charges, there is
something more than submission by the passenger to the delay of
a connection en route, "something more, therefore, than an inci-
dental interruption of the continuity of" an air movement.
If a commodity is waybilled interstate to a place with the gen-
eral intent that it be there reconsigned and shipped onward to
intrastate points there determined, the intent to have the goods
move beyond the distributing point does not render the movement
legally continuous:
Under the admitted facts, the city of Davenport became a distribut-
ing point for coal shipped by the consignor. The certainty in regard
to the shipments of coal ended at Davenport. The point where the
same was to be shipped beyond Davenport, if at all, was deter-
mined after the arrival of the coal at Davenport. The coal was
'Id. at 231.
72 Susquehanna Coal Co. v. City of South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665, 668 (1913).
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under the control of the consignee, and he could sell it in transit
or at Davenport, or reconsign it to a point on respondent's railway,
or any other railway, at his own discretion....
[T]he fact that commodities received on interstate shipments are
reshipped by the consignees, in the cars in which they are received,
to other points of destination, does not necessarily establish a con-
tinuity of movement, or prevent the reshipment to a point within
the same state from having an independent and intrastate charac-
ter.
73
The stopover break in California-Texas Fares is in one respect
weaker, but in another respect far stronger, than the Iowa coal
distribution break. The consignee's uncertainty of the coal's next
destination beyond Davenport contrasts with Mr. Nader's knowl-
edge of his entire itinerary at all relevant times. But on the other
side, anyone who pays for a stopover ticket must by necessary in-
ference intend to leave the plane, the concourse, and the terminal
to go about some unknown, separate activity at the visited cities,
indistinguishable from the general populace of the state. Signifi-
cantly, the Iowa coal was deemed to break its transit by doing
nothing more than sitting in the railroad's coal cars on the rail-
road tracks.
In the spring of 1914, Campbell's United Shows were touring
the Southwest. The plan was to tour from El Paso, Texas, through
Arizona and New Mexico and into California, using eighteen rail-
road cars. Campbell's arranged with one railroad for transport
from El Paso to Tucson. It separately obtained carriage from
Phoenix to California on the Santa Fe. From the Southern Pacific,
it demanded carriage to close the gap between Tucson and Phoenix.
When the Southern Pacific refused, except under high interstate
rates, Campbell's enlisted the aid of the state regulatory agency.
The agency ordered the railroad to provide the service sought
under intrastate rates. The Supreme Court upheld the agency order
against the railroad's challenge that "the proposed movement of
the shows was 'interstate in character.' .''
At the time of the state commission order, Campbell's was
"exhibiting for six days at Tucson," breaking the interstate trip
from Texas into Arizona. The formal arrangements for transporta-
73Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Iowa, 233 U.S. 334, 342, 343 (1914).
74 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 472, 475 (1919).
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tion from Phoenix to points outside the state, on the Santa Fe,
had not at that time been completed. The Supreme Court said:
"The mere intention of the shipper to ultimately continue his tour
beyond the state of Arizona did not convert the contemplated intra-
state movement into one that was interstate."'" Thus, it again
appears that the mere intention of a "Houston businessman" ulti-
mately to pursue his business beyond Dallas would, in the Court's
view, "not convert the contemplated intrastate movement into one
that was interstate." Nor could Mr. Nader's intent to return to
Washington at the conclusion of his activities in Los Angeles have
such an effect.
A decision under the Federal Employers' Liability Acte and
another under the Fair Labor Standards Act!" accord with the
foregoing decisions. Further, they illustrate the migration of the
constitutional principles therein set forth into statutory interpre-
tation. A similar migration of these principles into the Federal
Aviation Act has been acknowledged by the CAB."'
The cases discussed in this section involved stops followed by
onward movement planned to some extent in advance, but not
always fully communicated to the carriers involved. In the next
category of decisions, the plan to move beyond the stopping place
was more often known to the carrier. The following cases are thus
closest to the situation of the uninformed stopover passenger, such
as Mr. Nader, who innocently discloses his complete plans to the
airline. The outcome, however, seems generally unaffected by dis-
closure of itinerary.
75 Id. at 477. This is not a true case of a knowledgeable user deliberately with-
holding the itinerary from the carrier. Although Campbell's bought three separate
"contracts"- cf. passenger tickets-it does not appear to have been any part of
Campbell's purpose to conceal the fact that the Shows had come from Texas
into Arizona and were on their way to California. The case is in this respect
a hybrid with multiple ticketing, on the one hand, and apparent candor as to
itinerary, on the other. See also Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933).
7645 U.S.C. S 51-60 (1970). See McCluskey v. Marysville & N. Ry., 243
U.S. 36 (1917). Cf. Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. Hancock, 253 U.S. 284 (1920),
discussed supra note 41.
1729 U.S.C. 5 201-19 (1970 & Supp. 1975). See Higgins v. Carr Bros., 317
U.S. 572 (1943). Cf. Waling v. Jacksonville Paper Products Co., 317 U.S. 564
(1943), cited supra note 48.
7' See section IV, infra.
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B. Non-Incidental Interruptions Of Movement Planned And Com-
municated To the Carrier ("Uninformed" Stopovers) Break In-
terstate Movement.
Logs cut at Wentworth's location in New Hampshire (New
Hampshire logs) during the winter of 1879 were drawn by teams
down to Clear Stream and laid on the banks and the ice to await
the spring thaw. Other logs were harvested in Maine (Maine logs)
just across the Umbagog Lake, which straddles the Maine-New
Hampshire border and is the source of the Androscoggin River.
In 1879, the Maine logs had been rafted across the lake into New
Hampshire and the Androscoggin, but low water and ice had there
arrested their progress in the Town of Errol. The destination of all
the logs was the mills near Lewiston, Maine, far down the Andro-
scoggin. The upper Androscoggin, when it flows, flows through the
Town of Errol. On April 1, 1880, while the ice of New Hampshire
still held the logs in its frosty grasp, the Selectmen of Errol assessed
them for taxes.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court, quashed the tax as to the Maine logs and
upheld it as to the New Hampshire logs." The Maine logs had
been arrested by natural conditions while floating along the very
watercourse that would eventually transport them to their desti-
nation near Lewiston, and thus, "started... in a continuous route."
The New Hampshire logs had never been floated, but only "drawn
down from Wentworth's location," a separate, "preparatory" intra-
state movement. As the Supreme Court framed its holding:
[P]roducts of a state intended for exportation to another state...
do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the state,
subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual
way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common car-
rier for transportation, to another state, or have been started upon
such transportation in a continuous route or journey.
In another log drive decision seventeen years after Coe, again up-
holding a tax, the Court observed: "[W]e may say that the cases
establish that there may be an interior movement of property
"Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
10Id. at 527.
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which does not constitute interstate commerce, though the prop-
erty come from or be destined to another state. ... ""
A clear, strong decision on non-incidental interruption resulted
from a purchase by Mr. Bacon of grain in transit from the south-
west to New York and Philadelphia, under contracts with the
railroads permitting the consignee to withdraw the grain en route
for "the mere temporary purposes of inspecting, weighing, clean-
ing, clipping, drying, sacking, grading, or mixing, or changing the
ownership, consignee, or destination""2 thereof at Chicago. Bacon
availed himself of this privilege and was caught with his grain in
Chicago elevators on tax day. Upholding the tax, the Court said:
But neither the fact that the grain had come from outside the state,
nor the intention of the owner to send it to another state, and there
to dispose of it, can be deemed controlling when the taxing power
of the state of Illinois is concerned. The property was held by the
plaintiff in error in Chicago for his own purposes and with full
power of disposition. It was not being actually transported, and it
was not held by carriers for transportation."
In the same way, Mr. Nader had come from outside the State
of California to San Francisco and intended, as indicated on his
ticket, to proceed to Washington, D. C., beyond Los Angeles.
But these facts could not be considered controlling where the
power of California to regulate the fare for an intrastate trip from
San Francisco to Los Angeles is concerned:
The plaintiff in error had withdrawn [the grain] from the carriers.
The purpose of the withdrawal did not alter the fact that it had
ceased to be transported and had been placed in his hands. He had
the privilege of continuing the transportation under the shipping
contracts, but of this he might avail himself or not as he chose."
Similarly, Mr. Nader had withdrawn his person at San Francisco
and Los Angeles from the custody of United to go about his private
business. He had the privilege of continuing the transportation
under his ticket."2
8"Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U.S. 82, 96 (1903). The correct-
ness of this decision on its facts is open to doubt.
82 Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504, 506 (1913).
83 Id. at 515, 516.
84 Id.
"8 Mr. Nader's ticket was priced at a combination of three local rates, and
he could have cashed in his unused coupons for a full refund after traveling
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Mr. Bacon's case involved personal property tax. Subsequently,
in an intrastate-interstate regulation conflict, the Court upheld
state regulation by finding a break in journey (a manufacturing
process) where the intrastate movement was tied to the post-
manufacturing interstate movement by an incentive rate structure."
In a more recent decision, under a "transit" privilege contracted
with carriers, similar to that involved in Bacon, the Court dealt
with coal mined in New Jersey and freighted intrastate to Coal-
burg, New Jersey. In Coalburg the coal was put in piles to await
further shipment at a through rate contractually prearranged with
the railroad. The Court upheld the local tax, citing Bacon, and
observed: "That the storage of the coal is a part of a transit privi-
lege does not in itself sustain appellants' claim that the interstate
movement had not stopped sufficiently for the state's taxing power
to attach when the coal reached and was stored in Coalburg."8
The foregoing cases appear to stand at odds with the theory un-
derlying the California-Texas Fares decision that passengers in-
tending non-incidental stops in transit, and so informing the car-
riers (uninformed stopover passengers) are interstate in character."
IV. THE BOARD'S OWN PRIOR DECISIONS Do NOT POINT TOWARD
A CONCLUSION THAT DOMESTIC STOPOVER PASSENGERS ARE
IN CONTINUOUS INTERSTATE AIR TRANSPORTATION.
A. Board Orders Have Accepted The Applicability Of The Court
Cases Herein Discussed To The Identification Of "Air Trans-
portation" Under The Act.
1. The Canadian Colonial Case
The Act provides for economic regulation by the Board of
"foreign air transportation," which is air common carriage between
either to San Francisco or to Los Angeles. AIRLINE TARIFF PUBL. Co., LOCAL
AND JOINT PASSENGER RULES TARIFF No. PR-6 (CAB No. 142). Mr. Bacon's
grain was apparently on a through rate below the combined local rates east and
west of Chicago. In this respect, Mr. Nader's itinerary is more strongly broken
than was the movement of Mr. Bacon's grain.
86 Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 134 (1919).
8' Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, 79 (1947).
88But see Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Woodbury, 254 U.S. 357 (1920), in
which the issue of a "break" in trip by reason of an "apparent" stopover was
not raised.
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"a place in the United States and any place outside thereof.""9
The Board is not entrusted with regulation of air common carriage
between two places both outside the United States. This is so even
if the plane flies through the United States." Before the United
States entered World War II, Canadian Colonial Airways, Ltd.,
an airline of Canada, operated inclusive tour-type charter flights
on a DC-3 between Montreal, Quebec and Nassau, Bahamas,
through the United States. The southbound flights would land at
Jacksonville, Florida for refueling in the evening and would re-
main overnight. The passengers were restricted to expenditure of
no more than ten dollars in United States currency in Jacksonville.
The CAB expressly found that it would have been unsafe for the
flights to proceed to Nassau after dark.
The CAB held that, under these circumstances, Canadian
Colonial was not engaged in "foreign air transportation" to and
from Jacksonville. Discussing a number of the court cases support-
ing this result, the Board said:
With respect to the question of whether an interruption of a jour-
ney will affect the interstate nature thereof so as to render the por-
tion of the trip following or preceding the break of an intrastate
journey, it has been held in numerous cases that the essential na-
ture of the movement is determined by the ultimate destination of
the journey. If the stopover or interruption is merely an incidental
part of the whole trip to the ultimate destination, it is held that the
interruption does not change the nature of the traffic from inter-
state to intrastate commerce. . . .[citing cases]'
While the Board appropriately cited a number of the cases herein
discussed for the foregoing proposition, 2 it might well also have
invoked, as dispositive support for its holding, the language of
89Act, § 101(21)(c), 49 U.S.C. 5 1301(21)(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
90Under § 1108(b) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1508(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975),
the CAB is, however, given power to issue permits for the navigation of foreign
aircraft in the United States on a reciprocal basis.
"' Canadian Colonial Airways, Montreal-Nassau Service, 2 C.A.B. 752, 754
(1941).
92 Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929); Hughes Bros. Timber
v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926); Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R. v. Settle, 260 U.S.
166 (1922); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111 (1913); and
the case, not otherwise cited herein, Missouri-K.C.T.R.R. v. Northern Okla. Ry.,
25 F.2d 689 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 610 (1928). While these cases
provided an analogy that the Board deemed controlling, none involved a safety
interruption such as was presented in Canadian Colonial.
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Chief Justice Taft on a safety interruption in Brattleboro, that "it
was only a safety appliance in the course of the journey. It was a
harbor of refuge from danger to a shipment on its way.' 39 The
Canadian Colonial plane and passengers seem to fit most closely
within the category of through traffic rather than stopover traffic
as those terms are used in the California-Texas Fares decision.
2. The Resort Case
After the War, the CAB experimented with a temporary certifi-
cate limited to overseas (United States Territorial) and foreign
air transportation and further confined to package tours, including
air and ground elements, between east coast cities (including New
York and Miami) and Caribbean vacation stops. Resort, the holder
of this certificate, interpreted it to allow sale to New Yorkers of
vacation packages which included sojourns at Miami. The sched-
uled airlines serving the New York-Miami market considered such
activities inpermissibly similar to the "interstate" New York-Miami
business offered by their certificates.
In addressing this contention, the CAB held that Resort's status
was to be determined in accordance with the principles declared in
the judicial decisions. It further noted that Resort's business was
sui generis. Hence, the application of those principles could not
be a mechanical process:
Moreover, the intent of the shipper of property is to secure the
movement of goods via one-way transportation to some particular
destination, a significant factual element here absent. The passen-
ger cases also involve different legal and policy considerations, and
none of them deals with the effect of a planned recreational stop-
over on an escorted circular recreational tour where the passen-
ger's activities during both the stopover and the tour as a whole
are largely controlled by the carrier. ... "
The Board concluded that Miami stopovers would not convert
Resort's transportation to prohibit interstate air transportation so
long as such stopovers were strictly limited in duration."
The Board's reasoning in Resort, as described above, contributes
"3Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366, 379 (1922),
discussed supra, notes 44, 45.
'Resort Airlines Miami Stopover Investigation, 19 C.A.B. 1, 6 (1954).
Limited to 1/3 the duration of the total tour or, as modified in an unpub-
lished order, 7 days, whichever was longer. CAB Order E-8680, Sept. 30, 1954.
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to the present analysis in two principal respects. First, the Resort
opinion emphasized that there was no single "intended ultimate
destination" for the tours. The same conclusion seems appropriate
in California-Texas Fares with respect to the stopover passengers.'
The latter passengers must be regarded as attaching significance to
and as intending non-incidental activities at each point at which
their ticket permits an extended stay. No other inference seems
tenable in view of the substantial charges assessed for the stop-
over privilege.
The second helpful aspect of the Resort analysis is its careful re-
liance on the passengers' common, overriding purpose of participa-
tion in a carrier-organized, supervised, recreational tour, "which
embodies and at the same time transcends air transportation. '
The Board's description eloquently evokes the thread of continuity
that defines the tour passengers' purpose even when they are on
the ground, making it possible to view the Resort tour as a single,
continuous, unbroken activity. This demonstration presents a stark
contrast with the individually ticketed, scheduled, point-to-point
stopover passenger. The latter, unlike the Resort tour participant,
departs totally from the carrier's custody, supervision, knowledge,
and control and journeys to places unknown for private purposes
at each stopover point. The carrier plays no necessary part in
planning the passenger's activities once he leaves the concourse.
There are no controls on the maximum duration of the stay. There
is no demonstrable common purpose between any two or more
passengers. Indeed, there is nothing beyond the prearrangement for
onward carriage after the stop-a prearrangement indistinguish-
able from those held insufficient to impart continuity in the Bacon,
Arkadelphia, and Scheele cases."
By its recognition of the futility of seeking to define a single
"' See section I.D.2. of this article, supra.
"'Resort Airlines Miami Stopover Investigation, 19 C.A.B. 1, 11.
"See rotes 69, 73, and 74 supra. Additionally, Sprout v. South Bend, 277
U.S. 163 (1928), cited in the decision, at 5 n.11, is yet another instance of
traffic prepaying an interstate rate but being held intrastate because of an actual
break in movement within the state. The relevance of Sprout to the present
analysis is limited because it did not involve movement after, as well as before,
an interruption. It does add force to the point seemingly established in other
cases that the sandwiching of Mr. Nader's San Francisco-Los Angeles coupon
between two interstate coupons can be given virtually no weight in determining
the character of Mr. Nader's movement between the two California points.
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destination for a passenger who has significant nonincidental activi-
ties at several points on a complex itinerary, and by its necessary
reliance on the sui generis recreational tour purpose of Resort's
passengers, the Resort case seems, deeply to undermine the Cali-
fornia-Texas Fares classification of point-to-point stopover pas-
sengers as "interstate."
Board orders touching upon the question of legal break in air
movements subsequent to Resort have cited both Canadian Col-
onial" and Resort'' with general approval. The issues have not
been discussed in depth again. In a few instances, the later deci-
sions have included language apparently heedless of the Resort
admonition against misuse of judicial maxims hinging on the term
"destination.'
10 1
B. The Treatment Of Stopover Passengers In Foreign Air Trans-
portation Does Not Support A View That Domestic Stopover
Passengers Are In Continuous Movement.
Foreign airlines serving the United States do so pursuant to
foreign air carriers permits issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board
and the President of the United States." These permits authorize
only foreign air transportation.' °3 A number of foreign airlines hold
coterminal or lineal segment authority to serve two or more United
99 Bader Bros. Van Lines, Inc., CAB Order No. 74-6-110 (June 25, 1974).
'®Resort Renewal Case, 25 C.A.B. 562, 567 (1957).
101 See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding, 40 C.A.B. 745,
748 (1964), wherein the Board says, "But it is urged that the usual rule that the
origin and destination of the trip determines the nature of the transportation
should not be followed in this case because for the travel agents the stopover
at Miami was the dominant or principal part of the trip." Here, the Board seems
to stumble over the semantic snare it avoided in Resort. When the judicial cases
speak of "destination," they do not refer to the ticketed or paper destination,
but to the "dominant or principal part [purpose] of the trip." Thus, the urging
of Chief Administrative Law Judge Newmann and the Bureau was, in substance,
that the "usual rule" be followed and that Miami be found to be the principal
destination of the travel agents whose itinerary durations were tracked; See also
Tucson Airport Authority, TWA Certificate Amendment, 23 C.A.B. 772, 799
(1956).
10 The governing statutory provisions are § 402, 801, of the Act, 49 U.S.C.
§5 1372, 1461 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
103 For a definition of "foreign air transportation" see text supra note 76.
It is the policy of the United States to forbid cabotage to foreign airlines, pur-
suant to the right secured to each signatory nation by Article 7 of the Chicago
Convention, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
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States points on the same flight. For many years, these foreign
airlines have been permitted to carry on-line connecting and for-
eign stopover passengers between such common United States
points.
The principal feature that distinguishes this foreign stopover
authority from domestic is that, while the domestic stopover pas,
senger may use several different airlines, foreign stopover passengers
may be brought into or taken out of the United States only by the
same airline that provides the stopover carriage between United
States points.'
The Qantas case that stands as authority for this last proposition
rests on a detailed consideration of the legislative and international
treaty framework of foreign air carriage. It makes clear that the
entitlement of foreign airlines to carry single-carrier stopover pas-
sengers in the United States is not based on any theory that such
passengers are moving in a continuous flow of foreign air trans-
portation to which their stops are incidental. Qantas precludes the
foreign airlines from carrying transfer traffic brought into or taken
from the United States by another carrier, even though such traffic
is clearly through traffic within the meaning of the term in Califor-
nia-Texas Fares.
The Board noted in Qantas that the foreign carriers' entitle-
ment to United States point-to-point carriage of traffic brought
into or taken from the country on their own line depended, not
on concepts of flow and continuity, but on the expressed intent
of Congress on this particular subject. In explaining the develop-
ment of the governing practices, the Board said:
In issuing certificates and permits restricted [to foreign air trans-
portation], the Board has made the scope of permissible operations
dependent solely upon the haul performed by the holder between
points named in the route described in the certificate or permit,
without regard to whether the traffic itself is moving as part of the
continuous journey to or from a point not named in the certificate
or permit .... This 'carrier haul' approach has been used in route
descriptions notwithstanding the fact that the Board's jurisdiction
under the Act itself has generally been construed as embodying
'the flow of commerce concept."'
104 Qantas Empire Airways, Foreign Transfer Traffic, 29 C.A.B. 33 (1959).
103 Id. at 44, 45.
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The rationale of Qantas is that the single-carrier connecting
and stopover privileges accorded airlines in foreign air transporta-
tion are based on a special "carrier haur' approach. In contrast,
stopovers in domestic contexts are evaluated by the "flow of com-
merce" concept discussed in Canadian Colonial, Resort, and later
orders down to and including the California-Texas Fares deci-
sion.10
Similar to the Supreme Court cases, the CAB's own past de-
cisions bearing on the jurisdictional character of California and
Texas stopover passengers seem to map the territory by different
boundaries than those announced in California-Texas Fares.
IV. CONCLUSION
The inquiry detailed in the preceding pages fails to support a
conclusion that the California-Texas Fares order lies within the
Board's-as opposed to the states'-subject matter jurisdiction.
The Board has made a highly commendable effort to end a rank
injustice between knowledgeable and uninformed passengers in
California and Texas. It sought this result, however, under an
anti-discrimination statute addressing invidious distinctions only
between "descriptions of traffic in air transportation." (emphasis
supplied) .", If the analysis in this article be taken as a guide, neither
knowledgeable nor uninformed stopover passengers are in air trans-
portation within the statutory meaning of those words. Rather, all
are true intrastate passengers subject to state regulation.
This is not to say that the Board is without power to deal effec-
tively with the matters raised in Mr. Nader's complaint in Docket
23859, or that the resources devoted to investigating it in Califor-
nia-Texas Fares were wasted. A different section of the Act-' gives
the Board power to issue cease and desist orders prohibiting "un-
fair or deceptive practices . . . in air transportation or the sale
"'The distinction between foreign and domestic regulatory theory expounded
in Qantas was recently reaffirmed in Sitmar Cruises, Inc., CAB Order No. 75-8-88
(March 13, 1975).
107 Act, § 404(b), 49 U.S.C. S 1374(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
103 Act, § 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). As a consumer,
Mr. Nader did not fall within the limited categories of persons entitled by the
terms of this section to invoke it. Once possessed of Mr. Nader's complaint seek-
ing to invoke § 404, however, the Board could act under § 411 "on its own initi-
ative" to remedy, and prevent recurrences of, the injustice.
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thereof." (emphasis supplied). Arguably, it was the sale of Wash-
ington-San Francisco and Los Angeles-Washington air transpor-
tation that enabled United to charge Mr. Nader $18.50 more
for intrastate San Francisco-Los Angeles passage than the $16.50
specified in United's applicable intrastate tariff duly published and
filed with the California Public Utilities Commission. The Board
has in section 411 of the Act a sufficient warrant to insure that
the sale of services authorized under federal authority is not used
as the basis for unfair or misleading treatment of consumers with
respect to other services performed by federally-licensed carriers
under state supervision.
There are some practical differences between the results that
would flow from the Board's decision, on the one hand, and from
the conclusions of this article, on the other. Under the decision,
a single fare must be offered to all passengers making non-inci-
dental visits at both ends of an intrastate segment. But it must be
the higher interstate fare, except in markets having intrastate car-
rier competition. In the latter markets, the federally certificated
carrier is given an option to offer the intrastate fare level to all
passengers.
The view reached in this article would similarly require use of
a single fare for all passengers making non-incidental stops on an
intrastate segment. But that fare would in all instances be the
fare published in the carrier's tariffs applicable to intrastate pas-
sengers, in accordance with the laws of the state involved."9 The
Board's requirement to charge consumers a higher fare than that
allowed by state law in markets where there is no intrastate air-
line competition would vanish, as would the option to charge a
higher fare even where such competition is present.
The California-Texas Fares approach fixes the blame for unjust
discrimination on knowledgeable consumers. It takes the view that
these culpable users have so infiltrated the innocent, true intrastate
passengers that the latter must suffer the loss of the benefits of low
fares under state regulation. The CAB would impose this result
in order to frustrate the culprits seeking to classify themselves as
109 In Texas, this might in fact at times be the C.A.B. tariff. Theoretically, a
carrier could publish an intrastate fare higher than its interstate fare for the same
mileage. This, however, seems not to have occurred either in the railroad cases
discussed herein or in the Texas and California air passenger markets addressed
in California-Texas Fares.
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intrastate "contrary to fact.""... The analysis of this article reaches
a simpler and less cynical result. It maintains that the knowledge-
able stopover passengers are right. They, their uninformed breth-
ren, and the true intrastate passenger all should receive, automat-
ically, identical treatment under a view that they all constitute
intrastate traffic.
California-Texas Fares would oust the states from effective regu-
latory protection of even concededly true intrastate passengers using
the federally certificated airlines and threaten continued effective
state regulation of the intrastate airlines. The jurisdictional analysis
of this article avoids depriving the states of any regulatory control
they exercise today. It confirms state jurisdiction over wholly in-
trastate trips, a jurisdiction eroded by the practice of the federally
certificated carriers of issuing, at interstate rates, stopover tickets
including intrastate trips."'
This article is an effort to locate, through conventional legal
analysis, the boundary between federal and state jurisdiction over
carriage by air where that boundary intercepts the CAB's landmark
decision in California-Texas Fares. Perhaps in the last analysis it
also offers a practical alternative remedy for the public injustice
typified by Mr. Nader's California fare adventure five years ago.
If so, it seems that such public benefits are only the byproduct of
an unusually detailed inquiry into the correctness of a questionable
legal interpretation shared for some time by the CAB and its regu-
lated industry.
21 Decision, supra note 1, at 10 n.26.
"' The federally certificated carriers as a class are not, of course, guilty of
anything more reprehensible than resolving all doubts in favor of collecting the
larger fare. One airline-party to California-Texas Fares, Delta, sought forthrightly
to raise the question of the character of different descriptions of traffic. The ad-
ministrative law judge, however, responded as follows:
Delta suggests that there are no definitive guidelines with respect to
the criteria to be used to identify intrastate and interstate passen-
gers; and that there is a need for a clear definition of what con-
stitutes an intrastate passenger vis-a-vis an interstate passenger.
There is, of course, a clear and legally-sanctioned test for deter-
mining whether a passenger is interstate or intrastate. Moreover,
it is highly doubtful whether the precision which Delta seeks could
be attained by attempting to translate the legal definition into a
set of rules and regulations.
Interstate and Intrastate Fares in California and Texas Markets, Initial Decision,
CAB Docket No. 24779, served Apr. 23, 1974. Tariff Rule 100, supra note 32,
seems precise enough.
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To those who believe that reforms in our country's system of
air transport regulation are an urgent priority in the public interest,
the existence of public benefits as a byproduct of analytical legal
inquiry should unlock the gates to a little-explored field for regula-
tory reform. For it suggests that a detailed review of possibly ques-
tionable interpretations of existing law can, in some instances, dis-
close public benefits which could be realized without an act of
Congress, but which might rival those claimed for some portions
of the legislative reform proposals currently being urged.
